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It is generally acknowledged that humans have an egocentric bias; processing self-related stimuli in a 
specialised, preferential manner. The self-bias has been studied within cognitive domains such as 
memory, attention and perception; but never across cognitive domains in order to assess whether 
self-biases are a product of a common bias, or independent. This has relevance for conditions such 
as Autism Spectrum Disorder: certain self-biases are reduced in those with autism, but the pattern of 
results is not consistent across different cognitive domains. Self-bias was measured across the 
attentional and perceptual domains on two well-established tasks: the attentional blink (attention) 
and shape-label matching (perception) tasks. Processing of each participant’s own name was 
compared to processing of the name of another individual very familiar to the participant (to control 
for familiarity), and the name of an unfamiliar other. In the attentional domain, the attentional blink 
for the participant’s own name was reduced compared to that for the name of a familiar or 
unfamiliar other. In the perceptual domain, participants showed stronger associations between their 
own name and a geometric shape than between the other classes of names and associated shapes. 
Thus, strong evidence of a self-bias, independent of familiarity, was found on both tasks. However, 
across two experiments, the magnitude of the self-bias on the attentional blink and shape-label 
matching tasks was not correlated, supporting the idea that self-biases across cognitive domains are 








Over the centuries, the concept of ‘the self’ has fascinated philosophers and psychologists 
alike. Despite the lack of consensus on what exactly constitutes the human self-concept  (for two 
recent views, see Gallagher, 2013; Northoff, 2016), it is generally agreed that our experience of a 
unified sense of self strongly biases the way we process the world around us. Across different 
sensory modalities, and while performing a multitude of tasks, humans show a strong bias for 
processing self-related information such as one’s own face (Keyes & Brady, 2010) or name (Wood & 
Cowan, 1995). This self- (or egocentric) bias is argued to be closely linked to social functioning: a 
strong bias to process self-relevant cues is likely to lead to a more accurate model of the self and of 
those similar to us, enabling us to better infer their emotions and thoughts in a given situation 
(Conway, Catmur, & Bird, 2019; Goldman, 2006; Mitchell, 2009; Nijhof & Bird, 2019). However, 
should the self-bias be so extreme that it results in too little processing of other-related information, 
the development of associative links between cues to particular states in others and corresponding 
states in the self may be impacted. These links have been argued to be crucial in the development of 
imitation (Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 2009; Cook, Bird, Catmur, Press, & Heyes, 2014), empathy (Bird 
& Viding, 2014; Heyes & Bird, 2007; Quattrocki & Friston, 2014), and Theory of Mind (Ondobaka, 
Kilner, & Friston, 2017). Such an extreme focus on the self (‘egocentrism’) has been argued to be a 
cardinal feature of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD; Frith & de Vignemont, 2005; Lombardo & Baron-
Cohen, 2010), although several studies have since found the opposite pattern, that is: a decrease in 
specific aspects of self-preferential processing in ASD (Uddin, 2011; Williams, 2010). Studying the 
self-bias may therefore lead not only to understanding how individuals process self-related 
information and develop a self-concept, but may also shed light on their socio-cognitive ability and 
how this may be impacted in conditions such as ASD. 
While a self-bias has been observed on a number of tasks, the exact cognitive process it 
impacts is not yet clear. Across tasks, it has been claimed that a self-bias can be observed for several 
cognitive domains, including perception, memory and attention (see Cunningham & Turk, 2017, for 
an overview). For example, evidence for the claim that self-bias can be observed in the perceptual 
domain is provided by work by Sui and colleagues using the ‘shape-label matching task’ (Humphreys 
& Sui, 2015; Sui, He, & Humphreys, 2012). In this task participants learn to associate the self or 
others with neutral geometric shapes. When they subsequently have to judge whether specific 
shape-label combinations are correct, they show faster and more accurate performance for 
associations made to the self. Evidence that this effect is on perception (rather than attention) is 
provided by the fact that 1) the effect is maintained even when the self- or other-label is cued by the 
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associated shape (minimising attentional effects) (Humphreys & Sui, 2016; Wang, Humphreys, & Sui, 
2016), 2) functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging indicated less engagement of the frontoparietal 
attentional network for self-associations than other associations (Sui, Rotshtein, & Humphreys, 
2013), and 3) the self-bias influences reaction times in the same manner as manipulations of 
perceptual salience such as increasing or decreasing contrast (Sui, Liu, Mevorach, & Humphreys, 
2015). 
In the attentional domain, Shapiro, Caldwell and Sorensen (1997) have investigated the bias 
for one’s own name in the context of the attentional blink, using rapid serial visual presentation 
(RSVP): presenting streams of visual stimuli at a fast, fixed rate. The attentional blink describes the 
phenomenon that between approximately 200 and 500 milliseconds after the presentation of a first 
target (T1) in a RSVP stream, the ability to detect a second target (T2) is significantly reduced 
(Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992). By presenting the T2 at different temporal lags with respect to 
T1, the time course of the attentional blink can be studied with great precision. Theoretical accounts 
of the attentional blink suggest there is a temporal capacity-limit on selective attentional resources, 
and therefore attentional demands of processing the first target prevent these resources from being 
applied to the second target, thus creating the attentional blink (Dux & Marois, 2009; Martens & 
Wyble, 2010). This implies that people will show a reduced attentional blink for highly salient stimuli, 
as these require less attentional resources to be processed. Assuming the own name is such a highly 
salient stimulus, Shapiro and colleagues (1997) hypothesised that the attentional blink would be 
reduced for one’s own name (compared to another name). In a series of experiments, they tested 
attentional blink effects, contrasting the participant’s own name with another person’s name. It was 
indeed found that when presented as T2, one’s own name, in contrast to a stranger’s name, is 
resistant to the attentional blink: detection of one’s own name was similarly high at all temporal 
lags. Since the attentional blink is thought to reflect the depletion of attentional resources, the 
authors concluded that the own name survives the attentional blink because less resources are 
required to process it (see also Tibboel, De Houwer, Van Bockstaele, & Verschuere, 2013).  
Finally, in the domain of memory, it has been repeatedly shown that humans have superior 
memory for material that has been related to the self, a finding referred to as the self-reference 
effect (Symons & Johnson, 1997). The self-reference effect was initially found for stimuli that allow 
elaborate self-related processing, such as for personality traits after participants were asked to judge 
whether a trait applies to themselves, as compared to a specific other. However, a self-reference 
effect is also present for random objects after it is stated that they are owned by the participant 
versus by someone else: the ‘ownership effect’ (Cunningham, Turk, Macdonald, & Macrae, 2008). 
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A key question to be answered with respect to the effect of the self-bias on perception, 
attention and memory is whether these effects are 1) really one effect, 2) distinct but related, or 3) 
distinct and unrelated. The different self-biases could be considered one effect (1) if, for example, 
the effects on perception and memory were the product of the attentional self-bias such that self-
related shapes were perceived faster / as if they had greater contrast, or items / traits remembered 
better, as a result of being accorded greater attention. Alternatively, the self-biases observed in 
perception, attention and memory could be distinct effects, but driven by a common self-bias (2) 
such that, across individuals, the magnitude of the self-bias in one domain predicts the magnitude of 
the self-bias in another domain. Alternatively, the self-biases may be distinct effects and the 
magnitude of each effect unrelated to the others (3) such that, across individuals, there is no 
correlation between the magnitude of different self-biases. It is this question that the current study 
attempts to address.  
Specifically, the current study attempts to determine whether the self-biases reported in the 
perceptual and attentional domains are distinct by asking participants to complete both the shape-
label matching task and the attentional blink task. The perceptual basis of the self-bias observed in 
the shape-label matching task is supported by the psychological and neurological evidence indicated 
previously (Humphreys & Sui, 2016; Sui et al., 2013; Sui et al., 2015). However, problematically, the 
attentional nature of the self-bias observed in the attentional blink task is called into question by the 
results of Shapiro et al. (1997) when comparing the effects of using one’s own name (in contrast to a 
stranger’s name) as T1 in the attentional blink paradigm. If the attentional blink is driven by a 
temporal capacity-limit on selective attentional resources such that attentional demands of 
processing the first target prevent these resources from being applied to the second target, and 
one’s own name is less subject to the attentional blink when shown as T2 as it requires less 
attentional resources to be processed, then one would expect that one’s own name should elicit less 
of an attentional blink if used as T1 in comparison to a stranger’s name. However, Shapiro et al. 
(1997) did not find any difference in the attentional blink elicited following one’s own name, in 
comparison to a stranger’s name, when used as T1. Importantly however, sample size for this 
experiment was extremely low (N = 8), and we are not aware of any attempt to replicate this null 
result.  
Accordingly, Experiment 1 attempted to replicate this experiment with a larger sample size 
in order to establish whether any evidence for an attentional basis of the self-bias observed on the 
attentional blink could be found. If truly attentional, when one’s own name is used as T1 the 
attentional blink elicited should be reduced in magnitude compared to other names, as less 
attentional resources are required to process it, leaving additional resources for T2. In addition, we 
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also sought to control for effects of familiarity (to the extent that this is possible for one’s own 
name). Problematically for many studies of the self-bias, self-related stimuli tend to be more familiar 
than other-related stimuli, making it ambiguous as to whether any effects are a product of self-
relatedness specifically, or are instead a general effect of stimulus familiarity. To reduce this 
ambiguity, studies of self-bias typically contrast self-related stimuli (e.g. one’s own name) with 
familiar but not self-related stimuli (e.g. the name of someone close to you). When compared to 
unfamiliar stimuli (e.g. a stranger’s name), distinct effects of self-relatedness and familiarity can be 
observed (Cygan, Tacikowski, Ostaszewski, Chojnicka, & Nowicka, 2014; Nijhof, Goris, Brass, Dhar, & 
Wiersema, 2018; Tacikowski et al., 2011; Yang, Wang, Gu, Gao, & Zhao, 2013). To date, studies of 
the self-bias using the attentional blink have not used a familiarity control, so it was included in both 
Experiments 1 and 2. 
In order to address the relationship between self-biases observed in the shape-label 
matching task and the attentional blink task, Experiment 2A compared the magnitude of these self-
biases within the same individuals. Experiment 2B constituted a replication of 2A and also 
investigated the reliability of self-bias effects within the same task over a one week period. 
Surprisingly, to our knowledge, self-biases have never been compared in the same individuals 
before, and therefore there are no relevant data on the relationship between different self-biases. 
At the theoretical level however, the relationship between self-biases has attracted a lot of attention 
with respect to the differences in self-related processing observed in those with ASD. This 
theoretical work has been based on separate studies comparing the magnitude of different self-
biases in autistic1 and neurotypical individuals (Nijhof & Bird, 2019). For example, ownership self-
reference effects have been shown to be diminished in autistic individuals (Grisdale, Lind, Eacott, & 
Williams, 2014), and responses to one’s own name and face are reduced in autistic children and 
adults (Cygan et al., 2014; Nijhof et al., 2018; Werner, Dawson, Osterling, & Dinno, 2000). In 
contrast, the size of the self-bias observed on trait memory tasks and on the shape-label matching 
task did not differ between autistic and neurotypical individuals (Lind, Williams, Nicholson, Grainger, 
& Carruthers, 2019; Williams, Nicholson, & Grainger, 2017). Results such as these have led 
researchers to argue for a distinction between the representation of psychological and physical 
aspects of the self (Uddin, 2011; Williams, 2010), and a distinction between first- and second-order 
representations of the self (Williams et al., 2017) in autism. As noted, however, these theoretical 
distinctions are based on empirical work which compares self-biases in different samples of 
                                                          
1 To respect the wishes of autistic individuals and to report the study in line with scientific parlance, we use 
language preferred by clinical professionals (e.g., ‘individuals with autism’), as well as the term ‘autistic’, a 
term endorsed by many individuals with ASD (Kenny et al., 2016). 
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individuals rather than in the same individuals, further highlighting the need to compare self-biases 
in the same individuals. Given the relevance to ASD, autistic traits were measured in both 
Experiments 1 and 2.  
 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 sought to determine whether the self-bias observed on the attentional blink 
task is attentional in nature by determining whether one’s own name, in comparison to the name of 
someone close to the self (whose name should be familiar), and a stranger’s name, elicits a different 
attentional blink when used as T1 in the attentional blink paradigm. Specifically, if the self-bias is an 
attentional effect, one should expect a significantly reduced attentional blink following one’s own 
name compared to a stranger’s name. By comparing one’s own name with a close other’s name, 
Experiment 1 also allowed it to be determined, as far as is possible, whether any effect is a self-
related effect, or an effect of familiarity.  
 
Experiment 1 – Methods 
Participants 
We aimed to recruit a minimum of 33 participants, based on a calculation performed using 
G*Power (version 3.1), as this would provide 80% power to detect a medium-sized interaction effect 
between Lag and Condition (ηp2 = .09) at α = .05. Thirty-six participants took part in Experiment 1. 
However, two participants showed extremely low levels of T1 detection, and therefore data from 34 
participants (5 male, mean age: 26 years, S.D.: 7.3) were analysed. All participants reported no 
history of neurological or mental health difficulties, gave written informed consent prior to the 
study, and were financially compensated for their participation. The study was approved by the 
ethics committee of King’s College London (approval code MR/17/18-274). 
 
Attentional blink – Experimental task 
The attentional blink task was presented using PsychoPy version 1.85.4 (Peirce, 2007) on a 
23-inch monitor. Prior to the experiment, participants completed a short online form in which they 
provided their own name and the name of somebody close to them (Close Other condition). In 
addition, they eliminated names from a list of forty common English first names if there was 
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somebody close to them with that name. Eliminated names were excluded as stimuli, and one of the 
remaining names was selected for the Stranger condition. Names in all three conditions were on 
average six digits long, with no significant differences between conditions (F (2, 66) = 0.88, p = .38, 
ηp2 = 0.03). Finally, another remaining name from the list was selected as the name to be detected as 
T2.  RSVP streams of 15 first names were presented to participants (see Figure 1). Distractor names 
were selected from those that were not eliminated from the list of forty first names. The different T1 
conditions (own name, close other’s name, stranger’s name) were randomised on a trial-by-trial 
basis. Following a red fixation cross presented centrally for 1,000 ms, all 15 names were presented 
for 80 ms, with an inter-stimulus interval of 17 milliseconds. All stimuli were presented centrally on 
the screen in capitalised 40-point Arial, on a light grey background. Except for the T1, which was 
printed in white, all of the other 14 names were printed in black. T1 was presented either at the 
third, fourth or fifth position in the stream. The T2 name was presented at four different lags: Lag 1, 
Lag 2, Lag 5 and Lag 8, where the number corresponds to the number of stimulus presentations after 
T1 that T2 was presented. T2 was presented at each lag 9 times, thus for streams in which T2 was 
present this resulted in a total of 108 trials (3 (Condition) x 4 (T2 Lag) x 9 repetitions). An additional 
108 trials were presented in which T2 was absent, leading to a total of 216 trials. After the RSVP 
stream had finished, participants were prompted with two questions: 1. ‘What was the white word? 
Press spacebar when finished.’ 2. ‘Was [T2 name] present or not present? Press ‘c’ for present, ‘n’ 
for not present.’ To answer the first question, they typed in the name on the keyboard; to answer 





Figure 1. A visualisation of the Attentional Blink paradigm, with examples for the second target (T2) 
at Lag 2 and Lag 8. Note that the first target (T1) could be presented at position 3 (as shown here), 4 
or 5. 
 
Attentional blink – Control task.  
The stimuli, presentation and number of trials were identical to the experimental task, but 
on the control task participants were instructed that they were only required to determine whether 
T2 was present or not. 
 
Questionnaires 
To allow for correlating any found self-bias effects with autistic traits, all participants 
completed the 50-item Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, 
& Clubley, 2001), a widely-used self-report measure of autistic traits (observed Cronbach’s alpha 
across all studies: .84). They also completed the ‘Inclusion of Other in the Self’ scale (IOS; Aron, Aron, 
& Smollan, 1992) as a measure of ‘interpersonal closeness’ for the other two names that were used 
as T1 stimuli. Participants provided a rating between 1 and 7 for each name, where 1 indicated 
feeling ‘not close at all’, and 7 ‘very close’ to that person. This measure was included as a 
manipulation check to verify that participants rated the close other as being significantly closer to 
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them than the stranger. Results indicated that this was the case (t(33) = 17.54, p < .001, d = 3.01; 
Close Other: 5.6, Stranger: 1.2). 
 
Procedure 
Order of the Experimental and Control tasks was counterbalanced between participants. The 
first task was preceded by ten practice trials. Participants completed the AQ and the two IOS scales 
after completion of the computer-based tasks.  
 
Analysis 
Data were analysed using IBM SPSS version 24. Where data are analysed using ANOVA, 
partial eta squared (ηp2) values are reported as a measure of effect size, and Cohen’s d for t-tests. In 
cases where the assumption of sphericity was violated, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied 
and these values are reported. 
For the Experimental task, first, the number of correct T1 detections for each condition was 
calculated. Minor spelling mistakes were tolerated (e.g. ‘Lacy’ for ‘Lacey’) if the answer was still 
recognisable as the correct name. Using this criterion, all incorrect responses were manually 
checked by two independent raters, who showed an agreement rate of 98.1%. Any disagreements 
were resolved through discussion. Second, a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA was performed to 
test whether T1 detection accuracy differed by condition (Self/Close Other/Stranger). Third, we 
calculated the proportion of ‘T1-correct’ trials on which T2 was also correctly detected, for each lag 
and condition. The proportion of T2 trials correctly detected (given correct T1 detection) served as 
the dependent variable in a 3 x 4 repeated-measures ANOVA, with factors of Condition (Self/Close 
Other/Stranger) and Lag (1/2/5/8). This last analysis was also carried out for the Control task, with 
the proportion of correct T2 detections serving as the dependent variable. For the Experimental 
task, planned comparisons were carried out for the difference between Lag 2 and Lag 8, as 
attentional blink effects are typically largest at Lag 2, and Lag 8 is least susceptible to attentional 
blink effects (Raymond et al., 1992). 
Finally, correlational analyses were performed between participants’ AQ scores and their self-bias 
effects. Self-bias was operationalised by subtracting the difference between Lag 2 and Lag 8 for the 
Self condition, from that difference in each of the Close Other and Stranger conditions (thus 
encompassing both the effect of self-relatedness and of familiarity). We also carried out 
11 
 
correlational analyses within a Bayesian framework using JASP (https://jasp-stats.org; JASP Team, 
2016), to examine the strength of the evidence in favour of the null (r = 0) and alternative 
hypotheses (r ≠ 0). A Bayes Factor (BF01) approaching zero indicates that the data provide more 
evidence in favour of the alternative hypothesis (H1) than the null hypothesis (H0), a value of 1 
indicates that H0 and H1 are equally likely given the data, and values above 1 indicate greater 
support for H0. By convention, values below 1/3 and above 3 are taken as evidence in favour of H1 
and H0, respectively, while values between these values are judged to provide no evidence to favour 
either hypothesis. We used a stretched beta prior width of 0.5 as an estimate of a realistic H1 effect 
size. 
 
Experiment 1 – Results and Discussion 
Results for the Experimental and Control tasks are displayed in Figure 2.  
Although correct T1 detection was very high overall (94.7% on average), the ANOVA did 
reveal a significant effect of Condition (F(2, 66) = 6.06, p = .006, ηp2 = 0.16), with detection in the Self 
(97.4%) and Close Other (95.6%) conditions being significantly better than in the Stranger condition 
(91.0%, p = .007 and p = .02, respectively). Detection rates in the Self and Close Other conditions 
were not significantly different (p = .24). 
 For the Experimental task, the 3 (Condition) x 4 (Lag) repeated-measures ANOVA showed a 
significant main effect of Condition (F(2, 66) = 25.81, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.44), with better T2 detection in 
the Self condition than either Close Other or Stranger conditions (both p < .001), and better in the 
Close Other than the Stranger condition (p = .008). Furthermore, the main effect of Lag was 
significant (F(3, 99) = 54.01, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.62): T2 detection was worse at Lag 2 than at any of the 
other three lags (all p < .001), indicative of the typical attentional blink effect. Finally, the data 
showed a significant Condition x Lag interaction (F(6, 198) = 5.41, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.14). Planned 
comparisons showed that the difference between Lag 2 and Lag 8 was significantly smaller in the Self 
than the Close Other condition (t (33) = 2.10, p < .05, d = 0.36) and the Stranger condition (t (33) = 
2.59, p = .01, d = 0.45), with no difference between Close Other and Stranger (t (33) = 0.89, p = .38, d 
= 0.10).  
AQ scores ranged from 3 to 38 (M = 16.6, SD = 7.9). No significant correlations of differences 
between Self and Close Other (mean difference = 10.4, SD = 29.0), or Self and Stranger (mean 
difference = 14.6, SD = 32.8), with AQ score were found (Close Other: r (34) = .22, p = .22, BF01 = 
0.62; Stranger: r (34) = .27, p = .12, BF01 = 0.95).  
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 For the Control task, the ANOVA showed no significant main or interaction effects.  
 
 
Figure 2. Detection rates of T2 (given correct detection of T1 on the experimental task), +/- 1 
standard error of the mean. Solid lines: experimental task, dashed lines: control task. T1 was either 
of the three names (Self, Close Other, Stranger), T2 was a stranger’s name. 
 
Experiment 1 provided evidence of the attentional basis of the self-bias observed in the 
attentional blink task. The attentional blink effect was smaller following one’s own name when used 
as T1 than when a close other’s or stranger’s name was used. In contrast to extant theories 
(Lombardo & Baron-Cohen, 2010; Uddin, 2011; Williams, 2010; but see Williams et al., 2017, for a 
more nuanced view), the size of the self-bias was not predicted by autistic traits. It should however 
be noted that given the small sample size, combined with the BF only providing anecdotal evidence 
























Experiment 1 provided evidence that the self-bias observed on the attentional blink task has 
an attentional basis, Experiment 2A therefore compared the magnitude of the self-bias observed in 
the attentional blink task with that observed on the shape-label matching task (where the self-bias is 
thought to reflect an effect on perception) in the same set of participants.  
The attentional blink task used in Experiment 2A was the same as that used in Experiment 1, 
except that the experimental manipulation (own name, close other’s name, stranger’s name) 
occurred for T2 as is standard. Importantly, shape associations on the shape-label matching task 
were learnt with the same three first names that were used for the attentional blink task. This is a 
departure from the original task (Sui et al., 2012) in which the shapes were paired with the labels 
You, Friend, and Stranger. The use of such labels has been criticised as the self-label is a pronoun and 
the other two are nouns, introducing a potential lexical confound (Schäfer, Wentura, & Frings, 2017; 
Wade & Vickery, 2017). The use of three names avoids this potential confound, and allows 
comparison with the attentional blink task (although the use of the original labels may reduce any 
familiarity confound).  
 
Experiment 2A – Methods 
 
Participants 
Reported effect sizes for the differences between self and others on both the attentional 
blink and the shape-label matching task are large (ηp2 > 0.60; Sui et al., 2012; Tibboel et al., 2013). 
However, as the comparison between the Self and Close Other conditions was hypothesised to lead 
to smaller effect sizes, we aimed to test a minimum of 52 participants, corresponding to 80% power 
to detect an effect size of d = 0.40 at α = .05 for planned contrasts (paired-samples t-tests). With no 
prior research to guide the expected size of correlations between tasks, it should be noted that 
Experiment 2A had approximately 80% power to detect a correlation of .35.  
62 participants (10 male, mean age: 24 years, S.D.: 4.3) were recruited via online 
advertisements and a database of potential research volunteers held at King’s College London. Eight 
participants did not score above chance on the matching element of the shape-label task and were 
therefore excluded from analysis for this task, resulting in an overlapping sample of 54 participants 
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for both tasks (8 male, mean age: 24 years, S.D.: 4.3). Participants had no reported history of 
neurological or mental health difficulties. All participants gave written informed consent prior to the 
study and were financially compensated for their participation. 
 
Tasks 
Names were selected in the same way as for Experiment 1. Names in all three conditions 
were on average six digits long, with no significant differences between conditions (F (2, 122) = 0.67, 
p = 0.46, ηp2 = 0.01). 
Attentional blink task. All parameters were identical to those of Experiment 1, except where 
noted. The biggest change from Experiment 1 was that T1 was now one of ten strangers’ names that 
were not eliminated from the list of 40 names, and T2 was one of the three name conditions 
(Self/Close Other/Stranger), with the different T2 conditions divided over three blocks. All trials 
within the blocks were presented randomly and repeated 12 times. On 48 trials per block, T2 was 
present (4 T2 Lags x 12 repetitions). In addition to these trials, another 48 trials were presented in 
which T2 was absent, leading to a total of 96 trials per block. Participant instructions were the same 
as in Experiment 1. For each of the three blocks, there was a corresponding Control block, in which 
participants were instructed to only detect T2. 
Shape-label matching task: Association. The initial association of shapes and labels followed 
an adapted version of the procedure adopted by Wang, Humphreys and Sui (2016). Participants 
were required to associate three geometric shapes (circle, square, triangle) with three labels. To 
allow comparison with the attentional blink task and to control for possible effects of stimulus 
differences other than self-relevance (e.g., the lexical confound induced by using a pronoun versus 
two nouns; Schäfer et al., 2017), we used first names (the participant’s own name, the name of their 
close other, and the name of an unknown other) instead of the ‘you, friend, stranger’ labels used in 
previous studies (Sui et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2016).  
Participants were shown an instruction screen which included the following text: ‘You will 
learn to associate: the (Circle/Square/Triangle) with (name 1), the (Circle/Square/Triangle) with 
(name 2), and the (Circle/Square/Triangle) with (name 3). Your task is to choose which of the labels 
matches the shape in the display. Please press left for (name 1), down for (name 2), and right for 
(name 3).’ The individual shape-label pairs, and the order in which the labels appeared on the 
screen, was counterbalanced between participants. At the start of each trial, a central fixation cross 
was presented for 2,000 ms. Subsequently, a shape (3.3° x 3.3°) and the three labels (capitalised 40-
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point Arial) were presented together for 1,000 ms in white on a light grey background. The shape 
was presented above a fixation cross, and the labels were presented on the left, middle and right 
lower half of the screen. A blank screen followed the stimuli until participants’ response (left, down 
or right arrow) or for 2,000 ms, whichever was sooner. Finally, feedback was displayed for 500 ms; 
participants were shown the word ‘Good!’ if they answered correctly within the 2,000ms time limit, 
‘Too slow!’ if they did not respond in time, or ‘Wrong!’ if they answered incorrectly within the time 
limit. This phase of the task started after six practice trials and terminated as soon as participants 
responded correctly to each of the shapes six times consecutively. 
Shape-label matching task: Matching. For the matching task, the original paradigm 
developed by Sui et al. (2012) was used with the modified labels described above. All stimuli were 
presented in white on a light grey background. After an initial fixation cross that was on screen for 
500 ms, combinations of names and shapes were presented for 100 ms, with the shape (3.3° x 3.3°) 
presented above the fixation cross and the name (capitalised 40-point Arial) below it. Stimulus 
presentation was followed by an inter-trial interval varying between 800 and 1,200 ms. Participants 
were asked to respond to a matching combination of shape and name with the (left or right) arrow 
key, and with the other arrow key for a mismatch (left/right correspondence was counterbalanced 
between participants). After 12 practice trials, 360 trials were divided over three blocks. In each 
block, 20 matching and 20 non-matching pairs were presented for each of the three name 
conditions, in random order. Participants received feedback on each trial, for 500 ms, in the same 
format as during the association phase, and they were informed of their overall accuracy at the end 
of each block. 
 
Procedure 
Upon arrival, participants first performed the two computer-based tasks (attentional blink 
and shape-label matching task), the order of which was counterbalanced. For the attentional blink 
task, control and experimental blocks of the same condition (self, close other, stranger) were always 
presented together. Whether the control or experimental conditions came first was 
counterbalanced between participants, as was the order of the three conditions. Before starting the 
first block, participants carried out ten practice trials. After completion of the computer tasks 
participants completed the AQ and IOS questionnaires. Analysis of the IOS data revealed that 
participants rated the close other as being significantly closer to them than the stranger (t(61) = 





 For the attentional blink task, data were analysed in the same way as for Experiment 1, with 
the only difference being that the factor Condition now refers to T2, rather than T1. 
For the shape-label matching task, the analysis strategy of Sui et al. (2012) was adhered to. 
Accordingly, data were analysed using a 2 (Matching/Non-Matching) x 3 (Condition) repeated-
measures ANOVA, for both reaction time (RT) on correct trials, and accuracy. Given that self-
referential effects on this task are usually only found for the matching pairs, we planned follow-up 
analyses for matching and non-matching pairs separately. RTs three standard deviations above or 
below an individual’s mean RT were removed, eliminating 2% of the trials overall. 
Finally, correlational analyses were performed on self-bias effects across the two tasks, and 
for both effects with participants’ AQ score. On the attentional blink task, self-bias was 
operationalised as the difference in size of the attentional blink (Lag 8 – Lag 2) between the Self and 
Close Other conditions. Self-bias on the shape-label matching task was operationalised as the RT 
difference between the Self and Close Other conditions on matching trials. 
 
Experiment 2A – Results and Discussion 
 
Attentional blink task 
T2 detection rates (given correct T1 detection on the Experimental task) as a function of 
condition are displayed in Figure 3, for both the Experimental and the Control task.  
On the Experimental task, the T1 name was correctly detected on 86.3% of trials (agreement 
between two independent raters: 96.0%). T1 detection did not differ significantly between the three 
T2 conditions (F(2, 122) = 0.46, p = .64, ηp2 < 0.01). The 3 x 4 repeated-measures ANOVA carried out 
on the T2 correct detection data with factors Condition and Lag revealed a significant main effect of 
Condition (F(2, 122) = 105.90, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.64), with T2 detection being better in the Self than the 
Close Other and Stranger condition (both p < .001), and better in the Close Other than Stranger 
condition (p < .001). In addition, there was a significant main effect of Lag (F(3, 183) = 58.13, p < 
.001, ηp2 = 0.49): detection at Lag 2 was significantly worse than at all other lags (all p < .001), in line 
with the expected attentional blink effect. There was also a significant interaction effect between 
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Condition and Lag (F(6, 366) = 15.23, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.20). Planned comparisons revealed that the 
difference in detection rate between Lag 2 and Lag 8 was significantly smaller for the Self than for 
both the Close Other (t (61) = 4.61, p < .001, d = 0.59) and Stranger condition (t (61) = 6.21, p < .001, 
d = 0.79), and that this difference was also significantly smaller for the Close Other condition 
compared to the Stranger condition (t (61) = 2.40, p = .02, d = 0.30).  
 For the Control task, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Condition (F(2, 122) = 
29.54, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.33), with pairwise comparisons showing that T2 detection was better in the 
Self than in both the Close Other and Stranger condition (p = .002 and p < .001, respectively), and 
better for Close Other than for Stranger (p = < .001). Further, there was a main effect of Lag (F(3, 
183) = 8.69, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.13): T2 detection was worse at Lag 8 than at any of the other lags (all p 
< .01). The interaction effect between Condition and Lag was not significant (F(6, 366) = .625, p = 
.68). 
 
Figure 3. Detection rates of T2 for the four different lags (given correct detection of T1 on the 
experimental task), +/- 1 standard error of the mean. Solid lines: experimental task, dashed lines: 
control task. T1 was a stranger’s name, T2 was either the participant’s own name, the name of 






















Matching task  
RT and accuracy data from the matching task are displayed in Table 1. 
For reaction times, the 2 x 3 repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
Match (F(1, 53) = 120.72, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.70), with responses being faster for matching than for non-
matching pairs. Furthermore, there was a significant effect of Condition (F(2, 106) = 18.06, p < .001, 
ηp2 = 0.25). RTs were significantly faster in the Self condition than in the Close Other and Stranger 
conditions (p = .001 and p < .001, respectively), and faster for the Close Other than Stranger 
conditions (p = .01). The interaction effect between Match and Condition was also significant (F(2, 
106) = 5.25, p = .01, ηp2 = 0.09), and so the planned comparisons for the effect of Condition on 
matching and non-matching trials were performed separately. These revealed that the Condition 
effect was significant for the matching pairs (F(2, 106) = 13.36, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.20), with RTs in the 
Self condition being faster than those in the Close Other (t (53) = 3.13, p = .003, d = 0.43) or Stranger 
conditions (t (53) = 4.65, p <.001, d = 0.63), and faster in the Close Other than Stranger conditions (t 
(53) = 2.39, p = .02, d = 0.32). For the non-matching pairs, the Condition effect was also significant 
(F(2, 106) = 5.31, p = .01, ηp2 = 0.09), but planned comparisons revealed that only the difference 
between the Self and the Close Other (t (53) = 2.61, p = .01, d = 0.36), and Self and Stranger 
conditions were significant (t (53) = 3.02, p = .004, d = 0.42). The difference between the Close Other 
and Stranger (t (53) = 0.34, p = .74, d = 0.05) conditions was not significant. 
 Analysis of the accuracy data revealed a significant main effect of Match (F(1, 53) = 6.13, p = 
.02, ηp2 = 0.10), with responses being more accurate for matching than for non-matching pairs, as 
well as a main effect of Condition (F(2, 106) = 4.25, p = .02, ηp2 = 0.07), driven by a significant 
difference between Self and Stranger (p = .01). Further, there was a significant Match x Condition 
interaction (F(2, 106) = 11.61, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.18). Separate analyses for matching and non-matching 
trials showed a significant Condition effect for matching pairs (F(2, 106) = 10.89, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.17), 
with lower accuracy on the Stranger condition than the Self (t (53) = 4.28, p < .001, d = 0.58) and 
Close Other (t (53) = 2.79, p = .01, d = 0.38) conditions, and the difference in accuracy between Self 
and Close Other trials being close to significant (t (53) = 1.97, p = .05, d = 0.27). For non-matching 







Table 1. Mean reaction times and accuracy data for each condition in the shape-label matching task. 
 
Condition Mean RT (ms) Accuracy 
Match Self 550 (66) 0.81 (0.14) 
 
Close Other 571 (66) 0.77 (0.14) 
 
Stranger 589 (67) 0.70 (0.19) 
Non-match Self 612 (64) 0.71 (0.14) 
 
Close Other 622 (67) 0.72 (0.13) 
  Stranger 624 (57) 0.74 (0.13) 
Note: RT = reaction time in milliseconds; standard deviations in brackets. 
 
Cross Task Comparison and Autistic Traits 
Self-bias effects across the two tasks were not correlated (r (54) = .03, p = .85) and the 
Bayesian analysis provided stronger support for the null hypothesis (r = 0) than for the alternative 
hypothesis (r > 0); BF01 = 3.44). No significant correlation was found either when using accuracy 
rather than RT on the matching task (see Supplementary Material). 
AQ scores ranged from 4 to 31 (M = 17.7, SD = 6.2). A larger difference between Self and 
Close Other (M = 16.8, SD = 28.8) on the attentional blink task was associated with lower AQ scores, 
but this effect did not reach significance and its presence was not supported by the Bayesian analysis 
(r (62) = -.23, p = .07, BF01 = 0.94). The correlation between AQ and the Self-Stranger difference (M 
= 28.0, SD = 35.5) was also not significant (r (62) = .09, p = .48, BF01 = 3.35). Similarly, the level of 
self-bias on the shape-label matching task did not correlate significantly with AQ score for either 
Self-Close Other (M = 21.5, SD = 50.5; r (54) = -.12, p = .40, BF01 = 2.85) or Self-Stranger (M = 39.1, 
SD = 61.8; r (54) = -.07, p = .64, BF01 = 3.61), and Bayesian analyses indicated evidence in favour of 
the null hypothesis for all analyses. 
Robust self-biases (in addition to familiarity-biases) were observed on both the attentional 
blink and shape-label matching tasks. However, the magnitude of the self-biases was not correlated. 
Indeed, the use of Bayesian statistical techniques provided support for the null hypothesis of no 
association. Autistic traits did not predict the magnitude of the self-bias on either the attentional 
blink or shape-label matching task. Bayesian analyses indicated support for no association between 
AQ scores and the self-bias on the matching task, but that the evidence was inconclusive with 




Experiment 2B was designed to achieve two objectives. First, to replicate Experiment 2A in 
investigating the association between self-biases on the attentional blink and shape-label matching 
tasks in an independent sample. Second, to assess the reliability of the self-biases over a one-week 
period.  
 
Experiment 2B – Methods 
Participants 
We aimed to recruit the same number of participants as in experiment 2A, to provide a 
similar degree of power. Sixty-six participants were recruited via online advertisements, of whom 59 
(5 male) formed the final sample as they completed both tasks in week 1 as well as week 2. Five 
participants did not score above chance on the matching element of the shape-label task, and an 
additional four participants did not score above chance on T1 detection during the attentional blink 
task. These participants were therefore excluded from analysis. Participants had no reported history 
of neurological or mental health difficulties. All participants gave online informed consent prior to 
the study and were financially compensated for their participation. 
 
Tasks 
Task parameters were identical to those of Experiment 2A, except where noted. Both tasks 
were programmed to be carried out online, using Gorilla Experiment Builder (Anwyl-Irvine, 
Massonnié, Flitton, Kirkham, & Evershed, 2019).  
Attentional blink task. In order to reduce testing time, no Control blocks were presented on 
this task. 
Shape-label matching task. After an initial pilot, stimulus presentation in the matching 
phase was lengthened to 150 ms to accommodate visibility on screens with different refresh rates. 
Feedback was displayed as a green tick mark for correct answers, and as a red cross for answers that 






Participants performed the two computer-based tasks (attentional blink and shape-label 
matching task) online, with counterbalanced task order. They were instructed to perform the tasks 
on a laptop or PC (not a phone or tablet), and to avoid any distraction during task completion by 
turning off their mobile phone, music, and television. After completing both tasks successfully, six 
days later they received a reminder with a link to the tasks to be completed the next day. At week 2, 
tasks were presented in a reversed order relative to week 1. A sub-sample of participants completed 
the AQ alongside the attentional blink (N = 36) or matching (N = 35) task. 
 
Analysis 
 Data were analysed in the same way as for Experiment 2A, both for week 1 and week 2. In 
addition, to assess the test-retest reliability of the self-bias measures, the correlation between the 
difference in size of the attentional blink (Lag 8 – Lag 2) between the Self and Close Other conditions 
between week 1 and week 2 was calculated. For the shape-label matching task, the correlation 
between the RT difference between the Self and Close Other conditions on matching trials for week 
1 and week 2 was calculated. 
 
Experiment 2B – Results and Discussion 
 
Attentional Blink task 
T2 detection rates (given correct T1 detection) as a function of condition are displayed in 
Figures 4A (week 1) and 4B (week 2). A full description of the results can be found in the 
Supplementary Materials. 
Replicating the results of Experiment 2A, we found a significant interaction effect between 
Condition and Lag (Week 1: F(6, 324) = 23.76, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.31; Week 2: F(6, 324) = 27.38, p < 
.001, ηp2 = 0.34). Planned comparisons revealed that the difference in detection rate between Lag 2 
and Lag 8 was significantly smaller for the Self than for the Close Other (Week 1: t (54) = 4.38, p < 
.001, d = 0.59; Week 2: t (54) = 4.19, p < .001, d = 0.57) and the Stranger condition (Week 1: t (54) = 
7.82, p < .001, d = 1.06; Week 2: t (54) = 9.16, p < .001, d = 1.24), and for the Close Other condition 
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compared to the Stranger condition (Week 1: t (54) = 2.44, p = .02, d = 0.33; Week 2: t (54) = 4.89, p 
< .001, d = 0.66). 
 
Figure 4. Detection rates of T2 for the four different lags (given correct detection of T1), +/- 1 
standard error of the mean. A: week 1, B: week 2. T1 was a stranger’s name, T2 was either the 
participant’s own name, the name of somebody close to them, or the name of a stranger. 
 
Shape-label matching task  
RT and accuracy data from the matching task are displayed in Table 2. Replicating 
Experiment 2A, the Condition effect was significant for the matching pairs on both testing sessions 
(Week 1: F(2, 106) = 28.56, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.35; Week 2: F(2, 106) = 29.01, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.35), with 
RTs in the Self condition being faster than those in the Close Other (Week 1: t (53) = 4.44, p < .001, d 
= 0.60; Week 2: t (53) = 3.70, p = .001, d = 0.50) and Stranger conditions (Week 1: t (53) = 8.37, p < 
.001, d = 1.14; Week 2: t (53) = 8.34, p < .001, d = 1.14), and faster in the Close Other than Stranger 
conditions (Week 1: t (53) = 2.55, p = .01, d = 0.35; Week 2: t (53) = 3.62, p = .001, d = 0.49). A more 








Table 2. Mean reaction times and accuracy data for each condition in the shape-label matching task, 
for both week 1 (W1) and week 2 (W2). 
Note: RT = reaction time in milliseconds; standard deviations in brackets. 
 
Comparison Within and Across Tasks 
Experiment 2B revealed, in line with the findings of Exp 2A, that levels of self-bias across the 
two tasks were not significantly correlated between any of the time points, with Bayesian analyses 
indicating evidence for the null hypothesis for all comparisons: Matching week 1 (M = 33.4, SD = 
56.2) x AB week 1 (M = 16.3, SD = 29.9): r (50) = -.26, p = .07, BF01 = 10.30; Matching week 1 x AB 
week 2 (M = 11.3, SD = 20.6): r (50) = -.03, p = .83, BF01 = 4.49; Matching week 2 (M = 19.8, SD = 
41.6) x AB week 1: r (50) = -.24, p = .09, BF01 = 9.69; Matching week 2 x AB week 2: r (50) = -.04, p = 
.78, BF01 = 4.70. Combining the data from Experiments 2A and 2B (week 1 only) further confirms the 
absence of a relationship between the two measures of self-bias: in the total sample of 104 
participants, the correlation was still not found to be significant (r(104) = -.12, p = .22), with evidence 
strongly favouring the null hypothesis (BF01 = 11.55). The absence of a relationship is unlikely to be 
due to a lack of inter-individual variability: unconditional mixed modelling confirmed that the 
random effect of participant contributed significantly on both tasks (see Supplementary Material).  
The reliability of the self-bias on the attentional blink task was acceptable over a week, with 
higher reliability of the self-bias on the matching task (Attentional Blink: r (55) = .53, p < .001, BF01 < 
0.001; Matching: r (54) = 0.69, p < .001, BF01 = 0.001). These figures are over a week (and 
participants completed the two tasks immediately after each other during a test session) and so 
should be considered the lower-bound for reliability within a testing session, but they limit the size 
of the correlation that may be expected between tasks. Even though 5 of the 6 relevant correlations 
were weakly (and non-significantly) in the opposite direction to that expected if driven by a common 
self-bias, a measurement-error-corrected correlation between the attentional blink and matching 
tasks was calculated as specified by Fan (2003) using the combined data from Experiments 2A and 
 
Condition W1 mean RT (ms) W1 accuracy W2 mean RT (ms) W2 accuracy 
Match Self 645 (69) 0.87 (0.09) 631 (59) 0.90 (0.09) 
 
Close Other 678 (72) 0.81 (0.12) 652 (58) 0.87 (0.11) 
 
Stranger 696 (65) 0.73 (0.15) 673 (59) 0.82 (0.14) 
Non-match Self 735 (63) 0.77 (0.14) 707 (62) 0.82 (0.13) 
 
Close Other 750 (67) 0.76 (0.13) 715 (66) 0.82 (0.11) 
  Stranger 737 (71) 0.82 (0.11) 709 (56) 0.86 (0.10) 
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2B. As expected, this resulted in a negative correlation of slightly greater magnitude (r(104) = -.19), 
and thus was even further from the expected pattern of results if a common self-bias was driving 
performance on the attentional blink and matching tasks.  
Finally, combining data across Experiments 2A and 2B revealed non-significant correlations 
between AQ scores and the attentional blink (r (98) = -.06, p = .58, BF01 = 4.60) and matching (r(89) 




The aim of this study was to investigate further the human bias for self-relevant information 
by comparing self-bias effects across different cognitive domains: in the attentional domain using an 
attentional blink paradigm (Shapiro et al., 1997), and in the perceptual domain using the shape-label 
matching paradigm (Sui et al., 2012). In order to control for familiarity and lexical confounds, we 
compared the processing of first names in three categories (self, close other and stranger), and 
found that previous findings of self-bias could be replicated on both measures. Crucially however, 
the results also indicated that individuals’ level of self-bias was unrelated across the two different 
domains. The absence of any relationship calls into question the generalisability of self-biases across 
cognitive domains, contrasting with the idea of the self as an  ‘associative glue’; Sui & Humphreys, 
2015). It suggests there may be a multitude of independent effects of self-preferential processing in 
different domains, instead of one common effect of self-bias impacting all domains. Of course, as 
only two self-bias effects were investigated here, additional comparisons of different self-bias 
effects (such as those found in the memory domain) are needed in order to gain a more complete 
understanding of how self-relevant information is processed.  
In addition to the finding that the bias for one’s own name has independent effects on 
attentional and perceptual processing, the current results provide novel insights into the nature of 
self-processing within these two domains. In the attentional domain, we replicated and extended 
the findings of Shapiro and colleagues (1997). In three separate experiments, it was shown that 
seeing one’s own name within an attentional blink paradigm will decrease the size of the attentional 
blink. This was the case not only when the own name was used as T2 (Experiments 2A and B), but 
also when it was T1 (Experiment 1).  
In Experiments 2A and B, the attentional blink effect was significantly reduced when the T2 
to be detected was the participant’s own name, in comparison to either the name of somebody 
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close to the participant or a stranger’s name. The reduction in the attentional blink for one’s own 
name has already been shown in comparison with a stranger’s name (Shapiro et al., 1997; Tibboel et 
al., 2013), but since no previous study had compared the effect of one’s own name with a close 
other’s name, previous studies failed to distinguish between a self-related effect and a more general 
effect of familiarity. The present design was able to show both an effect of familiarity (the 
attentional blink was smaller for the name of a close other than that of a stranger) and a self-specific 
effect (the attentional blink effect was smaller for one’s own name than for a close other’s name), 
emphasising the importance of using highly familiar control stimuli in future research. It should be 
acknowledged, however, that it is likely the case that one’s own name is still more familiar than a 
close other’s name, and so a portion of the self-bias may still be attributable to familiarity. Findings 
from neuroimaging studies, however, showing selective patterns of activity in response to one’s own 
name, even when contrasted with a familiar other name, suggest that at least some of the self-bias 
is likely to be self-specific (Nijhof et al., 2018; Tacikowski et al., 2011).  
Interestingly, the results of Experiment 1 revealed that the attentional blink effect was also 
reduced when the participant’s own name was used as T1, in contrast to the null finding of Shapiro 
and colleagues (1997) in a small sample of 8 participants. This attentional blink reduction suggests 
that the own name is processed more efficiently, taking up less attentional resources, which are 
therefore available for processing of the T2. These results not only add insight into the processing of 
self-relevant information, but also inform theoretical accounts of the attentional blink more 
generally (Dux & Marois, 2009; Martens & Wyble, 2010). Dux and Marois (2009) hypothesize that 
the attentional blink reflects the processing of T1, which suppresses the attentional enhancement of 
T2. This stands in contrast to initial explanations of the attentional blink in terms of an all-or-none 
attentional bottleneck, where T2 processing is stalled until T1 has been fully processed. In line with 
their hypothesis, our findings suggest that if either T1 or T2 can be processed efficiently, as is the 
case for one’s own name, this reduces the size of the attentional blink. Reasoning about the 
attentional blink in terms of a resource-dependent attentional suppression, instead of an inflexible 
bottleneck, also fits with the finding that increasing the perceptual load on the T1 task can 
eventually eliminate the own-name effect on the attentional blink (Giesbrecht, Sy, & Lewis, 2009). 
Another finding from Experiment 1 suggests that the familiarity effect on the attentional 
blink task observed in Experiment 2 may not be purely attentional in nature. The T1 detection rate of 
one’s own name and a close other’s name was higher than that of a stranger’s name, but not 
significantly different from each other. As this effect was on detection of T1, it cannot be explained 
in terms of the attentional blink, and therefore may reflect a perceptual effect due to familiarity with 
the name stimuli. Similarly, the self-bias effect on the shape-label matching task may well have non-
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perceptual components; the evidence presented in terms of its perceptual basis is compelling, but it 
has also been explained as an associative learning advantage (Fuentes, Sui, Estévez, & Humphreys, 
2016), and neither explanation excludes a portion of the self-bias observed on the task being 
attentional in nature. If one allows that the tasks are not ‘process pure’ - that self-biases observed 
on both tasks may contain an element of an attentional and a perceptual effect with the balance 
differing between tasks – it becomes even more striking that the magnitude of the self-biases was 
not correlated within individuals.  
Importantly, the key finding from the work by Sui and colleagues (2012) of a self-bias in the 
perceptual domain was also replicated across two experiments when using first names instead of 
the labels ‘You’, ‘Friend’, and ‘Stranger’. As noted above, the use of individual first names as well as a 
‘close other’ category was designed to control for the confounding of self-relevance with familiarity. 
It is unlikely to completely remove all of the familiarity effect however, as one’s own name is still 
likely to be much more familiar than that of even the closest other person to us. It is therefore 
encouraging that reaction time patterns on the shape-label matching task are relatively independent 
of the exact self- and other-related labels that are used (Schäfer et al., 2017; Sui et al., 2012).  
 Finally, participants’ level of autistic traits as measured with the AQ was found not to 
correlate significantly with the level of self-bias on either of the tasks. However, even the total 
sample size of 98 participants completing the AQ and the attentional bias task, and 89 people 
completing the AQ and the matching task may be considered relatively small to detect individual 
difference effects. It should also be noted that even though the AQ score distribution was 
representative of that found in the general population (Ruzich et al., 2015), samples across the 
experiments largely consisted of female undergraduate students. It may be that the homogeneous 
student samples prevented us from finding significant correlations, as reductions in self-bias have 
previously been shown for autistic individuals (Cygan et al., 2014; Grisdale et al., 2014; Nijhof et al., 
2018). Future studies, using heterogeneous samples adequately powered for detecting small effect 
sizes, could resolve these issues. In the case of the matching task, however, the absence of a 
relationship replicates recent findings showing undiminished self-bias effects both for neurotypicals 
with high levels of autistic traits and for adults with autism (Williams et al., 2017). Regardless, as 
mentioned above, the absence of a correlation between measures of self-bias across the two 
cognitive domains suggests that the different self-biases observed across cognitive domains may not 
result from a common process.  
In summary, robust self-bias effects for one’s own name as compared to familiar and 
unfamiliar names were found across three experiments: in the attentional domain using an 
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attentional blink paradigm, and in the perceptual domain using a shape-label matching task. The 
magnitude of the self-bias effects was unrelated across the two domains. This finding suggests that 
self-biases are distinct rather than common across cognitive domains, a finding which has important 
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